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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

COMES NOW Plaintiff-Respondent Ford Elsaesser, m his capacity as the
personal representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Elsaesser" or the "PR"), 1 and hereby
submits this Respondent's Brief.
A.

Nature of the Case

The facts of this appeal are undisputed and established in the pleadings. For
example, it is not disputed that Defendant-Appellant Vernon K. Smith III ("Vernon III")
occupies a portion of Estate-owned property referred to herein as the "Raymond St. Property."
Nor is it disputed that Vernon III does not have the PR's permission to possess the same.
Consequently, the PR, on behalf of the Estate, previously demanded that Vernon III remove
himself and his belongings from the Raymond St. Property. Vernon III refused.
As a result, the PR filed a complaint, seeking ejectment and other relief. After
briefing and oral argument, Judge Hoagland correctly concluded that the PR proved the elements
of ejectment. The Court then issued a Judgment (and corresponding Writ of Assistance), ejecting
Vernon III from the Raymond St. Property. Judge Hoagland also certified the Judgment as final,
pursuant to I.R.C.P 54(b). Vernon III, through his counsel-who is also his father-Vernon K.
Smith, Jr. ("Vernon"), appealed.

1

Mr. Elsaesser recently succeeded the previous Personal Representative Noah G. Hillen
("Hillen"). Because Hillen was the Personal Representative of the Estate at all times material to
the lower court proceedings and because Mr. Elsaesser has stepped directly into Hillen's shoes as
the Personal Representative, this brief will use the term "PR" to refer to the Personal
Representative of the Estate at the operative time, be it Elsaesser or Hillen.
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Vernon III-but mostly Vernon-claims the Estate, acting through the PR, lacks
the authority to eject an unwanted party from Estate-owned property. Cutting through
Vernon Ill's/Vernon's irrelevant and incorrect facts and points, the disposition of this appeal
amounts to a single issue: does the PR have the authority, as a personal representative, to eject an
unwanted party from Estate property.
The PR does (and Hillen did) and hereby asks that this Court AFFIRM.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
1.

The Estate Case.

While not strictly relevant to this matter-or necessary to decide it-the PR offers
a brief background regarding how we got where we are currently. For the Court's convenience,
the PR notes that this section, and in fact much of this brief, is substantially the same as the
similar section filed by the PR in his Respondent's Brief in Supreme Court Docket No. 476872020, which is presently pending before this Court (the "Gibson Case").
Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria"), Vernon's mother, died in 2013. Matter of Estate

of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 463, 432 P.3d 6, 12 (2018). After Victoria's death, Judge Copsey, who
is presiding over Victoria's estate case (the "Estate Case"): (1) invalidated Victoria's will as the
product of undue influence by Vernon; and (2) set aside a series of transactions by which Vernon
transferred all of Victoria's property to himself or entities controlled by him. Id. at 465-66, 432
P.3d at 14-15. After issuing these rulings, Judge Copsey appointed Hillen as personal
representative of the Estate, and entered a judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
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70(b), which, for present purposes, vested title to the Raymond St. Property in the PR. (R. 159160).2 That Judgment is referred to herein as the "Rule 70 Judgment".
Vernon appealed the invalidation of the will, the decision to set aside the property
transfers, and the Rule 70 Judgment. Matter of Estate of Smith, supra. As part of that appeal, this
Court considered "any matters occurring up to and including the post-trial judgment under
Rule 70(b)." Id. at 466, 432 P.3d at 15. After such consideration, this Court concluded that "the
decisions of the magistrate court are affirmed." Id. at 482, 432 P.3d at 31.
2.

This Ejectment Action.

As a part of Estate administration, the PR-Hillen at the time-sought to remove
Vernon III from the Raymond St. Property. In so doing, Hillen filed this action by submitting a
complaint and asserting claims for ejectment (Count One), declaratory judgment/quiet title
(Count Two), trespass (Count Three), and unjust enrichment (Count Four). Each claim stems
from the fact that Vernon III refuses to vacate the Raymond St. Property and has not paid
remuneration for his occupancy. (R. 8-11).
Vernon III filed his Answer on July 3, 2019. (R. 25-45).
3.

The PR's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

After the pleadings closed, the PR moved for: (1) partial judgment on the
pleadings as to Count One for ejectment; (2) entry of a Writ of Assistance to effectuate the
Judgment; and (3) certification of the Judgment, if entered, as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b) (the
2 For ease of reading, references to the Clerk's Record on Appeal in this Brief are
designated by "R." followed by the page numbers cited with preceding zeros eliminated.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3

PR's "Motion"). (R. 46-47). The PR filed the Motion and memorandum in support on October 9,
2019. (R. 46-62). In addition, the PR filed a Declaration in Support of Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b) (Hillen's
"Declaration") that same day. (R. 59-62). The PR's Declaration was not filed because there was
any dispute from the pleadings as to any material fact, but only to support the need for a Writ of
Assistance and/or final certification if the PR's Motion was granted. (R. 57, n.4).
Vernon III opposed the Motion. In his November 8, 2019, response, Vernon III
raised arguments largely coextensive with the claims raised in his Opening Brief to this Court
(the "Opening Brief'). (R. 66-81); compare (R. 66-81) with the Opening Brief. Vernon III argues
that: (1) this Court had not upheld the Rule 70 Judgment (R. 71-74); (2) Vernon was, and is, the
owner of the Raymond St. Property via his status as an heir (e.g. R. 29); and (3) Hillen, as the
personal representative of the Estate at the time, lacked the power to eject a tenant from Estate
property unless necessary to satisfy an Estate creditor (R. 74-80).

4.

Judge Hoagland's Ruling and Judgment of Ejectment Against
Vernon III.

On December 3, 2019, and January 14, 2020, 3 Judge Hoagland heard oral
argument from the parties on the Motion. After taking the matter under advisement, Judge
Hoagland: ( 1) issued an Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings,

3

At the first oral argument on the Motion, Vernon indicated
submit an additional affidavit. (R. 153). Judge Hoagland provided
instead of an affidavit, Vernon III and Vernon submitted a twenty-two
Memorandum" (R. 130-151) that simply reiterated points raised
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he wanted more time to
the additional time, but
(22) page "Supplemental
in Vernon Ill's initial

Rule 54(B) Certification, and Writ of Assistance (R. 159-180, the "Order"); and (2) entered a
Judgment ejecting Vernon III from the Raymond St. Property (the "Judgment"). (R. 208-210).

5.

The Order Invalidated Most of Vernon Ill's Claims on Appeal.

Judge Hoagland's Order concludes that the elements of ejectment had been met:
(1) Hillen, as the personal representative of the Estate at the time, had sufficient ownership
interest to eject Vernon III from Estate property; (2) Vernon III was in possession of the
Raymond St. Property; and (3) Vernon III refused to surrender possession of the Raymond St.
Property. (R. 164-166).
Judge Hoagland also directly addressed many of the claims presented by
Vernon III on this appeal. For example, Judge Hoagland pointed out that, while Estate property
does generally devolve to the heirs upon the decedent's death, that rule is subject to limitations,
including the personal representative's right and obligation to "'take possession or control of, the
decedent's property[.]" (R. 166 (quoting LC.§ 15-3-709) (alteration in original)).
Judge Hoagland also noted that the personal representative of an estate has the
same power over estate property as that of an absolute owner. (R. 166 (quoting LC.§ 15-3-711)).
Finally, Judge Hoagland recognized that Vernon III' s pleadings were a thinly veiled collateral
attack on the Rule 70 Judgment and that Vernon III was "essentially request[ing] that the
[District] Court act as an appellate court and overrule the [Rule 70] Judgment in the other case,
something it cannot do." (R. 165 (quoting Judge Rippler's decision issued in the Gibson Case)).

oppos1t10n. The PR objected to the Supplemental Memorandum (R. 152-157), but Judge
Hoagland did not take any action with regard to striking it. (See R. 159-171 ).
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Vernon III filed his Notice of Appeal on March 16, 2020 (R. 223-252), and
submitted the Opening Brief on August 26, 2020. The Opening Brief raises few, if any,
arguments that were not directly and correctly considered and dismissed by Judge Hoagland
below. Vernon Ill's arguments still have no merit.
C.

Statement of Facts.
The facts necessary for this Court to uphold Judge Hoagland's Judgment and

Order are simple and undisputed. Prior to Victoria's death, she owned real property, including
the Raymond St. Property. (R. 159-160). Following Victoria's death, Judge Copsey, in the Estate
Case, appointed Hillen as the personal representative of the Estate and issued the Rule 70
Judgment, which, in part, conveyed the Raymond St. Property to the PR. (R. 160). Vernon III
currently occupies the Raymond St. Property. (R. 161). Despite demand from the PR to vacate,
Vernon III refuses to surrender possession of the Raymond St. Property. (R. 161).
That's it. Those are the only facts relevant to Judge Hoagland's Judgment and are
all that need be considered by this Court. Despite this, Vernon III goes on for page after page,
asserting "facts" that are irrelevant or untrue or both. The PR asks that this Court ignore the
Statement of Facts in the Opening Brief, which comprises little more than ad-hominem gripes
with Hillen in his capacity as the former PR. Opening Brief at 8-12. The facts described in
Vernon Ill's Statement of Facts are not supported by the record and the entire section is devoid
of even a single record citation. Opening Brief at 8-12.
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II.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The only true issue to be considered by this Court is whether the personal
representative of the Estate has sufficient power over Estate property to eject Vernon III
therefrom. Hillen had-and the PR does have-that power as correctly concluded by
Judge Hoagland. Vernon III' s arguments to the contrary reflect an incorrect understanding of
Idaho's Uniform Probate Code. Judge Hoagland's Order and Judgment were correct and
Vernon III has failed to show otherwise.

III.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The standard of review applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for
judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for motions for summary judgment. Trimble v.
Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1997) ("Thus, the standard of review

applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for summary judgment also applies to motions for
judgment on the pleadings."). "[W]here the record reveals no issues of disputed fact, the question
is one oflaw ... over which this Court exercises free review." Id.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Determined that the PR Proved The Three
Elements of Ejectment.

"An action for '[e]jectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the
defendants, and (3) refusal of the defendants to surrender possession."' PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp.
v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 63 7, 200 P .3d 1180, 1186 (2009) (quoting Ada County Highway
District v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008)). The

second and third elements of ejectment are conceded by Vernon III, so only the first element,
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ownership, is at issue here. Order at 6 (R. 164); (R. 26, 29, 33-34 (Vernon Ill's Answer
conceding that he possesses the Raymond St. Property and that he refuses to surrender
possession)). As correctly decided by Judge Hoagland, the PR owns the Raymond St. Property
sufficiently to prove the ownership element of ejectment for several different reasons, which are
addressed in tum below.

B.

The Personal Representative of the Estate is the Owner of the Raymond St.
Property and/or Enjoys the Same Power as That of An Owner.
As found by Judge Hoagland, "[t]he Rule 70(b) Judgment vested in Hillen 'any

and all real property of any kind or nature, including ... [the Raymond Street Property]." Order
at 7 (R. 165) (quoting Rule 70 Judgment). The Rule 70 Judgment is unambiguous. It vests all
right, title, and interest in the Raymond St. Property to the PR. The Rule 70 Judgment is a valid
judgment, lawfully issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. It has not been overturned or
otherwise successfully challenged. It is the law.
Beyond that-and what makes Vernon III' s repetitive arguments frivolous-is the
fact that this Court directly considered and upheld the Rule 70 Judgment. Matter of Estate of
Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 463, 432 P.3d 6, 12 (2018). The opening paragraph of this Court's

decision in Smith states that V emon appealed from decisions of the magistrate court "and a
corresponding judgment entered pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b) [the Rule 70
Judgment]. We affirm the decisions of the magistrate court." 164 Idaho at 463, 432 P.3d at 12.
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Given the ruling in Smith, the PR undisputedly owns the Raymond St. Property and can assert all
powers associated with such ownership. 4
But-and this is significant-even if the Rule 70 Judgment was somehow
ineffective, this is immaterial since the PR has the power over the Raymond St. Property as that
of an absolute owner, including the ability to eject Vernon III therefrom. Idaho's Uniform
Probate Code provides personal representatives with "the same power over the title to property
of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors
and others interested in the estate." LC.§ 15-3-711 (emphasis added). An absolute owner would
unquestionably have the power to eject an unwanted party from the owner's property. Therefore,
by the plain and unambiguous language of Idaho Code Section 15-3-711, Hillen had, and the PR
does have, the power to eject Vernon III from Estate property.
Along those same lines, Idaho Code Section 15-3-709 expressly provides that
personal representatives "may maintain an action to recover possession of [estate] property or to
determine the title thereto." LC. § 15-3-709. This ejectment action is an action to recover

4

Vernon III falsely claims that the enforceability of the Rule 70 Judgment was not
presented to this Court in the Smith case. Opening Brief at 27. If Vernon Ill's counsel were
uninvolved with the Smith case, the misstatement may be attributable to a simple mistake, but of
course Vernon himself brought the appeal resulting in the Smith decision, in which Vernon
expressly invited this Court to address the issue he now claims was not presented. "Vernon
respectfully requests this Court reverse the court's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment
upon the 2012 Transfers, together with the June 2, 2017 Judgment on Motion Under Rule
70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Appellant's Opening Brief (filed February 12,
2018), Matter of Estate of Smith, 2018 WL 2103594 (Idaho) at 2-3 (emphasis added). Additional
instances of Vernon's express requests for this Court to consider and reverse the Rule 70
Judgment can be found at pages 20 and 44 of his Appellant's Opening Brief, as well as page 35
of his Reply Brief (2018 WL 2462977).
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possession of Estate property, and the PR is statutorily enabled to maintain this action. To find
otherwise would require this Court to invalidate multiple sections of the Idaho Code. It should
not do so. Upholding Judge Hoagland's Order and Judgment is the only legally sound
conclusion. Because the three elements of ejectment are met here for multiple distinct reasons,
the Judgment and Order are proper and must be upheld.

C.

Vernon III Presents No Reason for Reversing the Judgment or Order.
The Court need look no further than the above analysis to uphold Judge

Hoagland's various decisions below. However, if the Court considers the voluminous and
irrelevant argument presented by Vernon III, nothing therein presents a valid reason to revisit
any of Judge Hoagland's decisions.

1.

The PR Has Never Asserted He Personally Owns Estate Property.

Vernon III' s incorrect analysis can all be traced to one misunderstanding
maintained by Vernon: he incorrectly believes the PR is asserting that the PR owns the Estate
property personally, rather than in his capacity as personal representative of the Estate. Once this
incorrect premise is assumed, it is a little easier to understand Vernon's concern that he will be
divested of his interest in Estate property, and a little easier to understand why Vernon thinks the
Judgment contains an inherent inconsistency.
Of course, the PR is not now asserting, and has never asserted, that he owns the
Raymond St. Property-or any Estate property-in his personal capacity. Hillen brought this
action in his capacity as the personal representative for the Estate so he could administer the
Estate to the benefit of all the heirs, including Vernon. That clarification nullifies all of Vernon's
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concerns. Vernon's interest as an heir of the Estate does not affect the PR's ejectment claim, and
Vernon's interest as an heir is unaffected by the outcome of this case.

2.

Vernon's Interest as an Heir of the Estate Does Not Defeat the PR's
Ejectment Claim.

Vernon III (through Vernon) claims Vernon's partial interest in the Raymond St.
Property became "vested" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-101 upon Victoria's death, and
that that somehow supersedes the Rule 70 Judgment. Opening Brief at 26-28, 30-31. Not so.
First, Section 15-3-101 does not mention permanently vesting interests, nor pre-emption of
future orders or judgments. Instead, that section opens by expressly noting that the rights of heirs
like Vernon "are subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this code to facilitate the
prompt settlement of estates." LC. § 15-3-101. To further emphasize this point, the section
concludes by noting that estate property "is subject ... to administration." Id.
So, contrary to Vernon's assertions, title to Estate property is not automatically
vested with him, but is instead subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in the Uniform
Probate Code and is otherwise subject to administration. The restrictions and limitations
contemplated by the Uniform Probate Code include the personal representative's "power over
the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have," (LC. § 15-3-711) as well as
the personal representative's "right to ... possession or control of, the decedent's property" and
statutory authority to "maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine the
title thereto." LC. § 15-3-709.
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The comments to Section 15-3-711 make it clear that the power conferred on
Hillen is "the broadest possible 'power over title"' and state that the power is "conceived to
embrace all possible transactions which might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets,
or in a change of possession." (Emphasis added.) Those powers, statutorily granted to Hillen
(and later passed to Elsaesser) as the personal representative, are precisely what empowers the
PR to bring and maintain this ejectment action, and are precisely why Judge Hoagland was
correct to issue the Judgment and Order.
Judge Hippler in the Gibson Case considered and rejected the applicability of the
case law Vernon cites. As was true in Gibson Case, the PR's analysis on the subject adds little to
Judge Hippler' s considered reasoning and concise distillation:
The cases cited by Gibson [and Vernon III here]do not compel a
different result. They stand for the general rule that a decedent's
property immediately descends to an heir upon the decedent's
death, but neither one addressed the language in LC. § 15-3-101
that an heir's right to a decedent's property "are subject to
restrictions and limitations." See generally, Ellmaker [v. Tabor],
160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 [(2015)]; Fairchild [v. Fairchild],
106 Idaho 147, 676 P.2d 722 [(1984)]. In those cases, there was no
need to consider a personal representative's temporary power over
the property, and its effect on an heir's right to immediate vesting
of title. In Ellmaker "there was no probate of [the decedent's]
estate." 160 Idaho at 580, 377 P.3d at 394, so there would not have
been a personal representative. And although in Fairchild the
estate had been probated, the issue in that case was whether one
heir had adversely possessed the property or instead was a cotenant
with the other heirs by common inheritance. 106 Idaho at 150,676
P .2d at 725. It had nothing to do with the personal representative's
temporary power to control the property. See id. Because neither
Ellmaker or Fairchild addressed any sort of "restriction"
mentioned in LC. § 15-3-101, their holdings are no more than
reiterations of the general rule. They do not help in deciding the
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scope of a personal representative's temporary statutory power
over a decedent's property.
Judge Rippler's Amended Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, Ada County Case No. CV0l-19-10368 at 5-6 (October 3,
2019). Vernon III presents no analysis or citation that alter the conclusion and the cases he cites
do not govern the scope of a personal representative's statutory power over a decedent's
property.
3.

Vernon's Interest in the Estate is Unaffected by and Irrelevant to This
Case.

Vernon asserts multiple times that Hillen is in breach of his fiduciary duties to the
Estate's heirs. See e.g. Opening Brief at 10-12, 19, 33, 42-44. This is untrue, but also irrelevant
as Vernon III has no standing to bring such an action.
It is undisputed that Vernon III is not an heir to the Estate, and is owed no

fiduciary duty by the PR. If Vernon feels Hillen was or the PR is in breach of his fiduciary
duties, he is free to raise those concerns in the appropriate forum, which is not this case. This
case is (or should have been) a simple action for ejectment comprising only three elements. That
the PR is not administering the Estate properly, as alleged by Vernon, is not a defense to any of
the elements of ej ectment.
No possible outcome of this case could divest Vernon of the interest he has as an
heir to the Estate. And, the Judgment that issued in this case does not affect that status. Rather, it
merely required Vernon III-who has no interest in the Estate-to vacate the Raymond St.
Property. Vernon's interests as an heir are unaffected, and the PR cannot use the Judgment as a
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sword to claim personal ownership of the Raymond St. Property because the Judgment says
nothing of the sort.

V.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 5

The PR is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs against Vernon III on
this appeal. The PR makes this request pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and Idaho Code § 12-121
(permitting an award of fees "when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."). At the risk of providing too fine a
point on the matter, Vernon III and his counsel have not presented any legitimate points of law or
fact as to why this Court should reverse any of the trial court's decisions/orders/judgments.
Vernon III simply repeats the same arguments to this Court that failed below. This Court should,
therefore, assess fees (and costs) against Vernon III and in favor of the PR.

5

Vernon III does not claim an entitlement to attorney fees in this appeal and should not
receive them. Vernon III appears to insinuate that, if he prevails, the District Court should award
him his appellate attorney fees after a trial. See Vernon III' s Opening Brief at 48-49. Vernon III' s
arguments are incorrect and he is not now and should not become the prevailing party. He is not
entitled to fees.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the PR respectfully requests that this Court:
(1) affirm Judge Hoagland's Judgment and Order; and (2) award the PR his attorneys' fees and
costs on appeal and in the proceedings below.
Respectfully submitted on September 23, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By
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Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman- Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of September, 2020, I caused a true
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